

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAM-01 AID-05 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EB-07 MC-02

IGA-01 IO-10 COME-00 /095 W  
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R 160847Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1589

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY SANA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 JIDDA 4337

CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O.: 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, MARR, SA, US

SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S PARTING CALL ON PRINCE SULTAN AND PRINCE

FAHD: A SENSE OF URGENCY ABOUT MILITARY SUPPLY AND  
DEVELOPMENT

SUMMARY: AFTERNOON OF JUNE 15 THE AMBASSADOR AND THE DCM MET  
WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE PRINCE SULTAN AND THAT EVENING WITH  
SULTAN AND CROWN PRINCE FAHD TOGETHER FOR DISCUSSIONS OF  
SAUDI-U.S. COOPERATION IN THE MILITARY FIELD. AT FIRST MEETING  
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SULTAN POINTED TO A NUMBER OF SHORTCOMINGS AND OUTLINED THE

MAJOR ROLE HE HOPED USMTM WOULD PLAY IN FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF SAUDI ARMED FORCES. SECOND MEETING WAS UNPRECEDENTED IN AMBASSADOR'S MIDDLE EAST EXPERIENCE. FAHD WAS DISTURBED AND DISTRAUGHT. HE SAID HE WAS DEEPLY DISCOURAGED AND DISAPPOINTED AT POOR PROSPECTS FOR SAUDI-U.S. COOPERATION IN THE MILITARY FIELD BECAUSE OF THE RECENT TREND OF U.S. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. THE U.S., HE SAID, MUST MAKE UP ITS MIND WHETHER IT INTENDED HELP SAUDI ARABIA WITH ITS MILITARY DEVELOPMENT. IF NOT, THERE ARE OTHERS WHO ARE EAGER AND READY TO ASSIST SAUDI MILITARY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. FAHD SAID HE HAD BEEN GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY HIS VISIT TO THE U.S. LAST YEAR WHEN MANY PROMISES HAD BEEN MADE. SINCE THEN IT WAS ALL DOWNHILL; ALL THE SAG HEARD WAS THAT ITS REQUESTS WERE BEING STUDIED. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL SEEMS TO BE GROWING. THE AMBASSADOR STRONGLY DEMURED. FAHD SAID HE WAS ACCUSED OF BEING AN AGENT OF THE U.S.; THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. WAS BECOMING AN EMBARRASSMENT. HE DID NOT INTEND THAT THE STATE OF THE SAUDI ARMED FORCES CONTINUE TO BE A SOURCE OF AMUSEMENT AMONG HIS NEIGHBORS. FAHD SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THREE-QUARTERS OF ALL SAG'S OVERSEAS INVESTMENTS WERE NOW BEING MADE IN THE U.S. WHETHER THIS TREND CONTINUED DEPENDED ON THE STATE OF SAUDI-U.S. RELATIONS. HE REITERATED THE NEED FOR THE U.S. TO CONTINUE TO ADOPT A FORTHCOMING STANCE AS REGARDS OUR ARMS RELATIONSHIP. END SUMMARY.

1. AT 1300 HOURS LOCAL JUNE 15, THE AMBASSADOR ACCOMPANIED BY DCM HORAN PAID A CALL ON MINISTER OF DEFENSE PRINCE SULTAN. THE AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED HE APPRECIATED THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH PRINCE A FEW PARTING THOUGHTS ON MATTERS OF U.S.-SAUDI MILITARY RELATIONS BEFORE LEAVING SAUDI ARABIA THE NEXT DAY ON APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS OF HOME LEAVE. SULTAN REPLIED THAT NOT ONLY HE, BUT CROWN PRINCE FAHD ALSO HOPED TO DISCUSS THE PRESENT STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF THE U.S.-SAUDI MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AMBASSADOR THAT EVENING. IN THE MEANTIME, SULTAN WOULD CONFINE HIMSELF TO A NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS. HE WAS VERY MUCH AWARE THAT MONEY BY ITSELF COULD NOT PROVIDE EFFECTIVE OR BALANCED ARMED FORCES. IT WAS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO DEVELOP THE HUMAN RESOURCES OF THE SAUDI ARMY. IN THE FUTURE HE WOULD LOOK PARTICULARLY TO USMTM FOR THE SCIENTIFIC TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINISTRY'S MANPOWER. IN ANT-

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ICIPATION OF THE EVENING'S MEETING, HOWEVER, PRINCE GAVE THE AMBASSADOR COPIES OF A NUMBER OF TALKING PAPERS THAT HAD BEEN GIVEN HIM BY HIS STAFF, AND WHICH CONCERNED VARIOUS OUTSTANDING POINTS WHICH HE HOPED THE AMBASSADOR WOULD FOLLOW UP WHILE IN WASHINGTON. (COMMENT: THESE LISTS WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPTEL FROM THE EMBASSY AND CHUSMTM. THEY INCLUDE MANY ITEMS THAT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE PAST, BUT IN PARTICULAR SULTAN SOUGHT ACTION ON (A) THE LOAN OF AN ADVANCED MICV

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER FOR HIS MINISTRY'S STUDY AND REVIEW;  
(B) ASSISTANCE WITH VARIOUS FORMS OF MINE LAYERS; (C) RAPID  
ACTION ON THE TOW MISSILE; AND (D) RECEIPT OF A STUDY ABOUT  
THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE F-15, F-16, AND F-17 AS THE RE-  
PLACEMENT FOR THE RSAF'S LIGHTNINGS, WHICH ARE DUE TO BE  
PHASED OUT IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD  
SULTAN HE WOULD BE GLAD TO FOLLOW UP THESE POINTS, AND THAT  
THE MINISTER COULD PERHAPS LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING SOME  
WORD FROM HIM IN TWO OR THREE WEEKS.

2. AT 1900 LOCAL THE SAME DAY, THE AMBSSADOR MET AT THE  
ROYAL DIWAN WITH PRINCE FAHD AND PRINCE SULTAN. DCM HORAN  
ALSO ATTENDED THE MEETING, AND CHUMSMT'S GENERAL AHMANN WAS  
PRESENT FOR PART OF IT. THE MEETING WAS UNPRECEDENTED IN  
THE MIDDLE EASTERN EXPERIENCE OF AMBASSADOR AKINS OR DCM HORAN.  
FAHD WAS DISTURBED AND DISTRAUGHT, AND UPON TAKING HIS SEAT  
HE PEREMPTORILY WAVED AWAY THE COFFEE BOY WHO ENTERED WITH  
THE TRADITIONAL BEDOUIN COFFEE. A FEW MINUTES LATER HE CHEWED  
OUT THE TEA BEARER, TELLING HIM THAT WHEN HE WANTED ANYTHING  
TO DRINK HE WOULD RING FOR IT. IN THE MEANTIME HE PROCEEDED TO  
TELL THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD TO MAKE UP  
ITS MIND WHETHER OR NOT IT WISHED TO ASSIST SAUDI ARABIA  
WITH ITS MILITARY DEVELOPMENT. IF NOT, THERE WOULD BE NO HARD  
FEELINGS ON THE SAUDI PART, U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS WOULD  
CONTINUE BUT SAUDI ARABIA HAD MANY FRIENDS - HE SPECIFICALLY  
MENTIONED FRANCE AND THE UK - WHO WERE EAGER TO PROVIDE THE  
MOST RAPID RESPONSE POSSIBLE TO SAUDI ARABIA'S MILITARY AND  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REQUESTS. THE PRINCE CONFESSED HE WAS  
DEEPLY DISCOURAGED AND DISAPPOINTED AT THE POOR PROSPECTS  
FOR U.S.-SAUDI MILITARY COOPERATION THAT HE PERCEIVED ON THE  
BASIS OF RECENT U.S. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. THE UNITED STATES  
WAS BOASTING OF THE AIR BRIDGE IT HAD CREATED TO FERRY ALL  
MANNER OF SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL, BUT  
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AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS SPEAKING IN A MOST HOSTILE AND CRITICAL  
TONE ABOUT FURNISHING SAUDI ARABIA - A TRADITIONAL ALLY -  
WITH WHAT IS NEEDED FOR ITS SELF-DEFENSE AND ITS ELEMENTARY  
MILITARY DEVELOPMENT. HE SPOKE THROUGHOUT IN AN AGITATED AND  
EMOTIONAL MANNER, AND REPEATEDLY BROKE IN TO INTERRUPT THE  
AMBASSADOR'S REPLY AND TO CONTINUE WITH HIS OWN PRESENTATION.

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R 160847Z JUN 75

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1590

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AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY SANA

AMEMBASSY TERAN

CINCEUR

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CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLAD

3. PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT IN HIS TRAVELS ABROAD HE WAS SOMETIMES ASHAMED TO BE A SAUDI. ALL OTHER ARMIES WERE BETTER TRAINED AND EQUIPPED THAN HIS OWN, AND HIS OFFICERS AND YOUNG MEN WERE GRUMBLING THAT WHILE SAUDI ARABIA WAS THE SOURCE OF FINANCING FOR OTHER MILITARY MACHINES, THEY THEMSELVES WERE 10 OR 20 YEARS BEHIND THE EXAMPLE OF THEIR ARAB NEIGHBORS. FAHD DID NOT BEGIN TO COMPARE THE SAUDI ARMED FORCES TO THOSE OF EGYPT, BUT IT SEEMED TO GALL HIM PARTICULAR THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF SYRIA AND JORDAN WERE GENERALLY ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE FAR IN ADVANCE THAN THOSE OF HIS OWN COUNTRY. HE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED  
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HIS FULL SUPPORT FOR PRINCE SULTAN'S MILITARY REQUESTS -  
WHICH HE REGARDED THE MINIMAL NEEDED - AND URGED THE AMBASSADOR

TO DO ALL THAT HE COULD ON THEIR BEHALF, NOT ONLY FOR THE  
SAKE OF THE KINGDOM OR MODA'S INTEREST BUT FOR THE SAKE OF  
U.S.-SAUDI ARELATIONS.

4. FAHD SAID THAT HE HAD LONG BEEN CONSIDERED AN AGENT OF  
THE UNITED STATES; HE HAD NOT MINDED THIS AS HE CONSIDERED IT  
AN HONOR TO BE A FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES. THE HIGH POINT  
IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WAS REACHED LAST YEAR WHEN HE VISITED  
WASHINGTON; HE SAW SECRETARIES KISSINGER AND SCHLESINGER;  
ALL DOORS WERE OPENED AND SWEEPING PROMISES WERE MADE. BUT  
NOTHING HAPPENED. ALL HE GOT FROM THE ADMINISTRATION WAS  
PROMISES THAT THE SAUDI REQUEST WERE BEING STUDIED AND THREATS  
FROM CONGRESS TO STOP ALL MILITARY DELIVERIES TO SAUDI ARABIA.  
THE AMBASSADOR SAID THIS JUST WAS NOT RPT NOT TRUE; OUR RECORD  
WAS GOOD; PRINCE SULTAN'S LIST OF COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS WAS  
SO LIMITED AND SO DEVOID OF MAJOR ISSUES THAT THE AMBASSADOR  
WAS RELIEVED AND PLEASED WHEN HE READ IT. (SULTAN HAD PREPARED  
ANOTHER LIST WHICH WE SAW SUBSEQUENTLY; IT INCLUDED A NUMBER  
OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS WE HAD ALREADY REFUSED SAUDI ARABIA;  
WE HAD THOUGHT STAKES HAD BEEN DRIVE THROUGH THE HEARTS OF THEIR  
REQUESTS AND THEY WERE SAFELY IN THEIR GRAVES. EVIDENTLY THEY  
WERE RESUSCITATED FOR THE MEETING. THEY WILL BE SUBMITTED  
SEPARATELY ALONG WITH THE OTHER REQUESTS.) FAHD REFUSED TO  
LISTEN; JUST REPEATED WITH GREATER FORCE THAT HIS RELATION-  
SHIP WITH US WAS A GROWING EMBARRASSMENT; THAT OUR DELAYS WERE  
DELIBERATE AND THAT OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL WAS APPARENTLY  
SO COMPLETE THAT IT PRECLUDED HELPING AN OLDER FRIEND.

5. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED PRINCE FAHD IF IT WOULD BE ALL RIGHT  
IF GENERAL AHMANN PARTICIPATED IN THE REMAINING PART OF THE  
DISCUSSIONS. THE PRINCE AGREED. WITH GENERAL AHMANN PRESENT,  
THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT IN DISCUSSION THAT DAY WITH  
CHUSMTM AND WITH MAJOR GENERAL HOEFILING, CHIEF OF INTER-  
NATIONAL LOGISTICS, IT APPEARED AS IF THE VAST MAJORITY OF  
PRINCE SULTAN'S REQUESTS COULD BE SATISFACTORILY MET. THE  
AMBASSADOR, HOWEVER, WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE QUALITY IN  
THE JORDANIAN AND THE SYRIAN ARMIES WHICH THEIR ROYAL HIGH-  
NESSES HAD NOTED AND ADMIRER WERE NOT SIMPLY A FACTOR OF  
THEIR MODERN ARMAMENTS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IN OUR EYES WAS  
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN POTENTIAL OF THE SAUDI ARMED FORCES.  
GENERAL AHMANN WAS A SOLDIER WITH A GREAT DEAL OF COMBAT  
EXPERIENCE, AND HE BELIEVED THAT THE COMBAT POTENTIAL OF THE  
SAUDI ARMED FORCES COULD BE INCREASED GREATLY. WE COULD NOT  
RPT NOT TELL IF FAHD UNDERSTOOD THE POINT BUT IF HE DID HE  
DID NOT AGREE. THE STATE OF AN ARMY, FAHD EVIDENTLY CONCLUDES,  
IS BASED LARGELY IF NOT EXCLUSIVELY ON THE SOPHISTICATION OF  
ITS WEAPONRY; TRAINING AND HARD WORK ARE MINOR CONCERNS. FAHD  
THEN REITERATED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE FUTURE OF U.S.-SAUDI

ARMS RELATIONSHIPS, AND THE NEED FOR ASSURANCE THAT THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO ADOPT A FORTHCOMING STANCE.

6. AT THIS POINT THE PRINCE TERMINATED THE MEETING. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO EXCUSE HIMSELF TO PROCEED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING. (THIS WAS NOT STRICTLY TRUE; THE MEETING WAS NOT SCHEDULED FOR ANOTHER HOUR.) HE ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO REMEMBER THAT THE SAG WAS PREPARED TO MOBILIZE ALL THE MAN-POWER SOURCES NECESSARY TO CREATE A FIRST-CLASS ARMY, UP TO THE LEVEL OF THAT OF THE JORDANIAN AND SYRIAN ONES, AND PREFERABLY EXCEEDING THEIRS. PRINCE SULTAN REMARKED THAT A PROPOSAL WOULD SOON BE PLACED BEFORE THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SUGGESTING VARIOUS FORMS OF COMPULSORY NATIONAL SERVICE, OR UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING FOR ALL YOUNG SAUDIS. THIS MIGHT VARY FROM ELECTIVE SERVICE IN ONE OF FIVE MINISTRIES, TO STRAIGHT UMT, WITH THE PREFERENCE IN THIS CASE BEING GIVEN TO MODA OVER OTHER MILITARY ARMS OF THE SAG.

7. PRINCE FAHD REMARKED THAT AT A RECENT COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING HE HAD LEARNED THAT THREE-QUARTERS OF ALL THE SAG'S INVESTMENTS OVERSEAS WERE BEING MADE IN THE UNITED STATES. WHETHER THIS TREND CONTINUED DEPENDED ENTIRELY UPON THE COURSE OF U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS. HE REITERATED HIS FEELING THAT FOR REASONS OF DOMESTIC AND INTER-ARAB POLITICS SAUDI ARABIA COULD NOT INDEFINITELY CONTINUE TO HAVE AN ARMY THAT WAS THE OBJECT OF HUMOR AMONG ITS NEIGHBORS. THE SAG REQUIRED A FORCE THAT WOULD BE CAPABLE NOT ONLY OF DEFENDING ITS NORTHERN FRONTIER, BUT ALSO OF ASSURING THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF NEIGHBORING STATES IN THE PENINSULA.

8. COMMENT: PRINCE FAHD WAS OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO GET IN HIS LAST LICKS BEFORE THE AMBASSADOR DEPARTED FOR THE UNITED  
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STATES ON HOME LEAVE. HE WAS UNDOUBTEDLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE CRITICISM OF U.S.-SAUDI ARMS RELATIONSHIPS THAT IS BEING HEARD IN CONGRESS. HIS FEELING ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF SOME KIND OF VISIBLE, HIGH-IMPACT MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY PRESSURES THAT MINISTER OF DEFENSE PRINCE SULTAN IS EXPERIENCING WITHIN HIS MINISTRY AND WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AS A RESULT OF THE REVELATIONS BY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES OF APPARENT WRONGDOING IN MILITARY CONTRACTS BETWEEN U.S. CORPORATIONS AND THE SAG SULTAN PROBABLY NEEDS TO WIN A FEW THESE DAYS. AS MENTIONED ABOVE, THE SPECIFICS OF SULTAN'S MILITARY REQUESTS, AND RECOMMENDED REPLIES (TO BE PASSED TO SULTAN VIA DCM HORAN IN AMBASSADOR AKINS' NAME) WILL FOLLOW BY SEPTTEL IN A COUPLE OF DAYS.  
AKINS

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